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Benjamin L. McKean, Ohio State UniversityContemporary debates about ideal and nonideal theory rest on an underlying consensus that the primary practical task
of political theory is directing action. This overlooks other urgent practical work that theory can do, including showing
how injustice can be made bearable and how resisting it can be meaningful. I illustrate this important possibility by
revisiting the purpose for which John Rawls originally developed the concept of ideal theory: reconciling a democratic
public to living in a ﬂawed world that may otherwise seem more of a home for catastrophe than justice. However,
Rawls’s account of reconciliation is ﬂawed; because of his methodology, the realistic utopia he constructs as a source of
hope can be used to defend an unjust status quo. By drawing lessons from Theodor Adorno’s contrasting view of
reconciliation after the Holocaust, I offer a more democratic method for political theory to offer sources of hope to the
public.Why does political theory matter in a world ofurgent and overwhelming injustice? Contempo-rary answers to this question often assume that
theory should guide our response to injustice by directing us
to particular actions. In this framework, the debate concerns
whether ideal or nonideal theorizing is better suited to this
task. Partisans of the former argue that, without an appro-
priate ideal, we will not know whether or not we are on the
right path to justice (Simmons 2010); partisans of the latter
contend that such ideals are uninformative about the prac-
tical choices we face today (Sen 2009). This underlying con-
sensus that the primary practical task of political theory is
directing action crucially overlooks how theories can shape
attitudes toward what is possible in politics. As a result, the
emotional and affective dimensions of responding to injus-
tice are often marginalized, and imaginative reﬂections on
possible futures are wrongly presumed to be practically inert.
In this article, I seek to rectify these exclusions and argue that
political theory can have practical force by showing how in-
justice can be bearable and resisting it can be meaningful,
rather than by commanding any particular action. To do
this, I revisit the practical purpose for which John Rawls orig-
inally developed the concept of ideal theory: to help reconcile
a democratic public to living in a broken world that may seem
more of a home for catastrophe than justice. Rawls was not
alone in ﬁnding this task essential in the aftermath of WorldBenjamin L. McKean (mckean.41@osu.edu) is an assistant professor of political
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dor Adorno recast the concept of reconciliation, employed
by Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel to demonstrate the
underlying rationality of human existence, to respond to the
palpable irrationality of the twentieth century. As I will show,
their accounts of reconciliation, which are in some respects
mirror images of each other’s, are ﬂawed but nevertheless
offer important lessons for how political theorists can re-
spond to contemporary injustice.
Convinced that theodicy was impossible after Auschwitz,
Rawls saw overcoming injustice not only as an organiza-
tional challenge but also as an affective one, since the prev-
alence of injustice can induce despair and lead us to doubt
the possibility of ever achieving justice. If such doubts be-
come pervasive within a democratic public, the consequences
can be dire, as citizens abandon the values that sustain their
coexistence. By describing a realistic utopia, ideal theory can
reconcile the public and give its members the hope needed to
sustain the long struggle against injustice. Crucially, rather
than imagining ideal theory as the province of a special few
with access to an obscure truth, Rawls conceives of reconcili-
ation as properly having an essentially democratic character,
addressing its audience as equally capable of reﬂecting on
politics as professional philosophers. However, Rawls’s ac-
count is notably ﬂawed. While Rawls explicitly conceives of
ideal theory as a political practice within a democratic societyscience at Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210.
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1. A notable exception is Weithman (2009). Other practical tasks
identiﬁed by Rawls include resolving political conﬂict by uncovering
“some underlying basis of philosophical and moral agreement” (2001a, 2)
and providing an orientation to political and social institutions. See Rawls
(2001a, 1–5, 2007, 10–11).
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ideal theory from material he believes his audience already
accepts. Yet, in a democracy characterized by unjust institu-
tions, there are no facts or theories we should presume ev-
eryone accepts, and so, contrary to Rawls’s avowed intentions,
his methodology actually makes it much more likely that ideal
theory will become ideological by turning certain facts about
our unjust world into features of a purported utopia.
To rectify these problems, I turn to Adorno’s contrasting
defense of the practical affective import of philosophy after
the Holocaust. Like Rawls, Adorno seeks to take the concept
of reconciliation from its Kantian and Hegelian origins and
make it adequate to a damaged world in which theodicy
appears implausible. If Rawls can be said to offer a dem-
ocratic conception of the audience for political theory but
an undemocratic mode of addressing them, Adorno offers
something like the reverse. On his view, wemust go on living
our own lives even amid catastrophic suffering, though do-
ing so requires us to make ourselves somewhat cold and in-
different. Where Rawls seeks to banish this cynical indiffer-
ence despite the persistence of the injustice that provokes it,
Adorno suggests that the best way to preserve the hope of
complete reconciliation under such circumstances is instead
to take responsibility for making ourselves cold and so refuse
to be entirely reconciled. This assumption of responsibility
acknowledges the way theorists are themselves affected by
injustice and productively highlights the way their thinking
remains provisional and vulnerable to failure. Adorno’s view
thus chastens Rawls’s, guarding against the temptation of
declaring unjust arrangements ideal and keeping the space of
political possibility open for more radical proposals. Yet,
while Adorno’s mode of addressing the public is egalitarian
in foregrounding his own imperfection and fallibility, his
conception of audience is not. An account that divides the
world into cold theorists and suffering others lacks the
conceptual resources to conceive of its audience as potential
equal partners in organizing against injustice, making it un-
duly difﬁcult to imagine undertaking cooperative political
action. Consequently, I conclude by suggesting that we should
pursue a more fully democratic theory of reconciliation that
would ﬁnd reasons for hope in our imperfect relations with
each other.
SEEKING RECONCILIATION AFTER KANT AND HEGEL
Rawls’s concern to reconcile a democratic public is not ob-
vious from his ofﬁcial deﬁnitions of ideal and nonideal theory.
Rawls describes ideal theory as concerning “what a perfectly
just, or nearly just, constitutional regime might be like” as-
suming favorable conditions and strict compliance by (nearly)
everyone with the principles of justice (2001a, 13). Nonideal151247.proof.3d 2 Achorn Interntheory, by contrast, relaxes those conditions to consider how
to deal with individuals or peoples who do not comply or how
to deal with unfavorable conditions in which “historical, so-
cial, and economic circumstances”make it difﬁcult to achieve
a well-ordered regime (Rawls 2001b, 5). Yet Rawls is clear
that the practical role of ideal theory is so important that its
content is conceived with that in mind, asserting that “The
very content of the ﬁrst principles of justice, in contrast with
the content of derivative standards and precepts, is deter-
mined in part by the practical task of political philosophy”
(1999a, 330). Despite this, Rawls’s account of the practical
task of reconciliation and how it shapes the content of his
ideal theory has been overlooked.1 The task of reconciling us
to our social world—a function, he notes, “stressed by Hegel
in his Philosophy of Right (1821)”—leads philosophy to en-
courage its audience “to accept and afﬁrm our social world
positively, not merely to be resigned to it” (2001a, 3). Why
is this a worthwhile aim? Strikingly, Rawls turns to Kant to
explain the urgency of this task, suggesting, “If a reasonably
just Society of Peoples whose members subordinate their
power to reasonable aims is not possible, and human beings
are largely amoral, if not incurably cynical and self-centered,
one might ask, with Kant, whether it is worthwhile for hu-
man beings to live on the earth” (2001b, 127). Consequently,
a brief account of these earlier thinkers—and what made
their accounts seem impossible to accept after the Holocaust—
is essential.
Kant famously asks, “What may I hope?” because we of-
ten seem to need information beyond the ability of reason
to know (1989, 677). In the ﬁrst instance, this concerns
reconciliation between nature and freedom; we cannot know
theoretically that we are free, but we must make our freedom
a “practically necessary presupposition” if we are to act at all
(Kant 1996, 52). However, Kant can see that the freedom of
many people is constrained by war and oppressive political
institutions.What are reasonable hopes for enjoying freedom
in the future given these grim circumstances? Kant argues
that we should believe that humanity is inexorably pro-
gressing toward a world of republican states living in perpet-
ual peace. Just as it is practically necessary for an individual to
assume his own freedom in order to act, so too does Kant
argue that we ought to adopt this view of progress for its
practical necessity. If we see history as “the human race from
period to period taking steps upward toward virtue and soon
after falling back just as deeply into vice and misery,” then we06/14/17 13:10ational
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progress would mean that existing suffering and oppression
is pointless, which would be “contrary to the morality of a
wise creator and ruler of the world” (Kant 1996, 306). Con-
sequently, we adopt this representation of history not on the
grounds that it most accurately reﬂects our discernment of
its objective features—they may seem to us an incomprehen-
sible heap of happenings—but because it is more advanta-
geous for overcoming nihilistic alienation. As Kant says, “Such
a justiﬁcation of nature—or rather perhaps of providence—is
no mean motive for adopting a particular point of view in
considering the world” (1997, 52). Thus, for Kant, to reconcile
ourselves to the world as it is requires believing that we are
progressing toward freedom and justice; to think otherwise
would be to see life and action as a farce and to reject the
possibility of an authentic theodicy.
With such an explanation in hand, we can make even the
evils of wars tolerable, not only because we can be conﬁdent
they will fade away but also because we can see them as
contributing to progress. Kant tells us that “what affords
this guarantee (surety) [of approaching perpetual peace] is
nothing less than the great artist nature (natura daedala
rerum) from whose mechanical course purposiveness shines
forth visibly, letting concord arise by means of the discord
between human beings even against their will” (1996, 331).
In other words, we should see nature as guaranteeing that
the exercise of human freedom contributes to progress even
when individuals have no such intentions. This enables him
to explain great evils because of the way that they can ad-
vance the cause of progress, writing, for example, “So long as
human culture remains at its present stage, war is therefore
an indispensable means of advancing it further” (1997, 232).
One can see here the risk of such a progressive narrative
serving ideological ends, as an unjust war could be defended
in the name of perpetual peace.2 But Kant thinks this must be
risked since the alternative—to refuse to believe in nature’s
guarantee that human freedom will progressively lead to
perpetual peace—comes at too high a cost.
By contrast, Hegel does not see reconciliation as justiﬁed
with reference to practical necessity or the future, but by
the rationality of existing institutions.3 Key to Hegel’s view
is the famous dictum, “What is rational is actual; and what is2. For a recent defense of Kant’s view of hope, see Goldman (2012).
For more on the role of reconciliation in structuring Kant’s approach to
politics, see Flikschuh (2000, 74–79).
3. Hegel does place his account of reconciliation within a narrative of
historical progress, but it is an account of progress already achieved and so
does not direct attention to the future. I put this to one side since Rawls
attempts to offer an account of reconciliation in Hegel independent of
these considerations. See Rawls (2000, 330).
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matters is to recognize in the semblance of the temporal and
transient the substance which is immanent and the eternal
which is present” (Hegel 1991, 20). Hegel views the social
world as having an underlying rational structure, which it is
philosophy’s task to comprehend. Reconciliation is the state
of fullest rationality when institutions are arranged to re-
spect the freedom of individuals and individuals recognize the
rationality of existing institutions for doing so. Because the
individual feels at home in the world and understands why
he feels that way—indeed, understands why this very un-
derstanding is itself essential to feeling truly at home—he is
most able to act within that world, conﬁdent of the meaning
and appropriateness of his actions. Since Hegel believes that
the world’s rational structure is manifest in modern society,
philosophy has the task of shepherding individuals to this
awareness by alleviating their alienation.4
Near the close of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel observes,
“The present has cast off its barbarism and unjust arbitrar-
iness, and truth has cast off its otherworldliness and con-
tingent force, so that the true reconciliation, which reveals
the state as the image and actuality of reason, has become
objective” (1991, 380). However, after Auschwitz, Rawls and
Adorno understandably ﬁnd it impossible to accept this.
The world returned to barbarism with a vengeance—and
with the state leading the way. Nor is Kant’s faith in progress
any easier to accept. That faith is deeply connected to his
defense of the possibility of theodicy, which both Rawls and
Adorno reject. Absent such faith, the ability to believe that
the horrors of war can be understood to contribute to prog-
ress falters in the face of Auschwitz. Yet, while the Holo-
caust may block any straightforward adoption of Kant’s
view, it can also be understood to deepen the need that he
responded to. If atrocities of such scale are possible, then we
seem to have good reason to wonder if there is any point to
contemplating political ideals when we cannot even stop
barbarity. As the next section establishes, Rawls felt this
worry acutely and consequently repurposed elements from
Kant’s and Hegel’s accounts of reconciliation to defend the
importance of ideal theory after Auschwitz.
IDEAL THEORY AND THE HOLOCAUST
AS PARADIGM INJUSTICE
Rawls’s own biography tellingly illustrates this affective chal-
lenge posed by gross injustice. By his own account, Rawls4. For a useful discussion of Hegelian alienation, see Hardimon (1994).
Notably, Rawls advised the dissertation from which Hardimon’s book grew,
and Rawls singles out this work as valuable secondary literature in Rawls
(2000, 329).
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early in his life and considered attending divinity school to
become a minister. His undergraduate thesis at Princeton was
a work of Protestant theology that analyzed the concepts of
faith and sin and included a rebuke of social contract theory.5
The experience of World War II changed his views, however;
Rawls reports that he “abandoned [his faith] entirely by June of
1945,” transforming his interest in politics and justice. In an
undated essay from the 1990s, Rawls reﬂected on his experi-
ence:
How could I pray and ask God to help me, or my
family, or my country, or any other cherished thing I
cared about, when God would not save millions of Jews
from Hitler. When Lincoln interprets the Civil War as
God’s punishment for the sin of slavery, deserved
equally by North and South, God is seen as acting
justly. But the Holocaust can’t be interpreted in that
way, and all attempts to do so that I have read are
hideous and evil. To interpret history as expressing
God’s will, God’s will must accord with the most basic
ideas of justice as we know them. For what else can the
most basic justice be? Thus, I soon came to reject the
idea of the supremacy of the divine will as also hideous
and evil (Rawls 2009, 263).
Rawls’s rejection of theodicy is clear and direct. The Holo-
caust is so monstrous that God must be rejected if He would
permit such atrocities. Note how Rawls contrasts the Holo-
caust with the enormous evil of slavery, which in turn
spawned the slaughter of the Civil War. While Rawls ﬁnds it
possible to imagine a theodicy that would reconcile him to a
world in which sin begat sin and injustice was met with in-
justice, the Holocaust shatters that ability to rationalize.6
So how is one to motivate moral action in a world that seems
to be equally at home with genocide? One need not share5. See Rawls (2009); for additional context, see Gregory (2007). Bio-
graphical information is drawn from Freeman (2007) and Pogge (2007).
Biographical quotes in this paragraph from Rawls himself are from Rawls
(2009, 261–63). Rawls’s repudiation of his earlier faith there is so complete
that he writes: “To the extent that Christianity is taken seriously, I came to
think it could have deleterious effects on one’s character” (265). Notably,
as a graduate student, Rawls spent the summer of 1949 producing the
index for Walter Kaufmann’s book on Nietzsche.
6. One might also reject the theodicy Lincoln offered in his Second
Inaugural and ﬁnd in slavery itself sufﬁcient grounds for questioning the
justice of history. Even if the Civil War can be understood as a ﬁtting
punishment for the actions of whites in the North and South, what evil
can African Americans have committed that could make their enslave-
ment seem ﬁtting to them?
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potential meaninglessness of our attempts to achieve justice
when we cannot prevent horriﬁc evils. Rawls’s concern pre-
sents a deep problem for any theory that purports to guide
action or invoke a better future.
How does Rawls address this problem of motivating ac-
tion against injustice, after acknowledging that our world is
one in which the scale of injustice can overwhelm us? Ex-
plicitly drawing on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Rawls argues
that the reconciliation ideal theory can provide is an essential
precondition to effective political engagement with our so-
cial world. For Hegel, Rawls writes, “Political philosophy
may try to calm our frustration and rage against our society
and its history by showing us the way in which its institu-
tions, when properly understood from a philosophical point
of view, are rational, and developed over time as they did to
attain their present, rational form” (Rawls 2001a, 3; see also
Rawls 2007, 10–11). For Rawls, political philosophy should
help conﬁrm for us the meaningfulness of our political ac-
tion and protect us from anxieties about futility and nihilism;
good political theory should be able to make us feel more at
home in the world. However, if it is the awfulness of the
world that prompted our worry, how can we feel that the
institutions of such a world are fundamentally connected
to rationality?
In Joshua Cohen’s interpretation, Rawls persists in a
straightforward endorsement of the Hegelian slogan that
what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational. As
Cohen has it, Rawls endorses “a Hegelian Doppelsatz: we
need to accommodate the ideal to the real because the real
manifests the ideal” (2009, 59–60). This helps us to under-
stand why some features of our world, such as the existence
of reasonable pluralism, should not frustrate us. On the Rawl-
sian picture, while we might wish that everyone agreed with
us completely, the free exercise of our moral powers is of
great value to our freedom, even if it leads people to different
conclusions that we must tolerate and our institutions must
accommodate. But while this addresses some frustrations
with society, the Doppelsatz cannot be the whole story for
Rawls. Reconciliation cannot occur by seeing the reality of
genocide as a manifestation of the ideal in any sense, yet nei-
ther can it be ignored. So how can ideal theory contribute to
reconciliation after Auschwitz?
Rather than trying to reconcile us by identifying some-
thing ideal in such horror, Rawls suggests that ideal theory
can sustain us by training our eyes on a distant but realistic
utopia—a task that he identiﬁes as “a variation of ” Hegelian
reconciliation (2001a, 4). Indeed, Rawls echoes Kant’s ori-
entation to a better future when he argues that “by showing
how the social world may realize the features of a realistic06/14/17 13:10ational
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litical endeavor, and in working toward it gives meaning to
what we can do today” (2001b, 128). Having seen that just
institutions are achievable on earth, our world can seem more
of a home to us. While critics have emphasized the practical
and conceptual problems with identifying a long-term goal
without considering the means for achieving it, they have
largely overlooked the worry about political affect that mo-
tivates Rawls to envision such an ideal (cf. Geuss 2005; Wiens
2015). Rawls imagines a desirable future, because with it po-
litical philosophy can provide a warrant for political practice
against the fear of meaninglessness and hopelessness through
what Peter Brooks calls “the anticipation of retrospection” (1992,
23). Our political actions today appear meaningful by looking
back on them from the perspective of an achieved realistic
utopia; this perspective enables us to feel that our actions will
have contributed to justice in a way obscured by our uncer-
tain present. For example, envisioning a society in which Rawls’s
two principles of justice are fully realized can help corrob-
orate the meaningfulness of working for more modest re-
distributive policies in the present. Reconciliation after Ausch-
witz thus becomes possible because we draw hope and comfort
not from accepting institutions as they are, but from per-
ceiving the possibility of their transformation.
Rawls is careful to note that the idea of a realistic utopia
“establishes that such a world can exist somewhere and at
some time, but not that it must be, or will be” (2001b, 127).
This diverges from the philosophies of history that Kant
and Hegel offer and raises the question: Why should this
possibility matter to us? Rawls suggests two reasons. First,
Rawls writes, “I believe that the very possibility of such a
social order can itself reconcile us to the social world. The
possibility is not a mere logical possibility, but one that
connects with the deep tendencies and inclinations of the
social world” (2001b, 128; emphasis added). This suggests
that we care about a realistic utopia, because, with a proper
understanding of our own society, we can hypothesize a re-
lationship of historical continuity to a better future. Where
the Doppelsatz suggests that some apparent misfortune al-
ready exhibits features of the better future, this approach
suggests that we can identify progressive trends in society
that give us reason to think that contemporary injustices
will be overcome without suggesting that there is anything
ideal or redemptive in those injustices themselves. Second,
Rawls writes: “Political philosophy is realistically utopianwhen
it extends what are ordinarily thought to be the limits of prac-
ticable political possibility and, in so doing, reconciles us to our
political and social condition” (2001b, 11; emphasis added).
This suggests a potentially different connection, since the fu-
ture is represented as an extension of ordinary thought about151247.proof.3d 5 Achorn Internthe limits of possibility rather than of deep and perhaps un-
acknowledged social tendencies. Such a utopia can provide
hope and solace not only because I individually believe it is
possible but because its practicability is generally accepted, at
least implicitly; I can more readily feel at a home in an im-
perfect society when I know that my hopes for the future are
compatible with its conventional wisdom. However, while or-
dinary thought about political possibility may be an expres-
sion of the same deep social tendencies that justify hope, it
may also express something different; in societies marked by
injustice, ordinary thought can be habituated to regard deeply
ﬂawed institutions as the best that can be hoped for. In the
next two sections, I explore these possibilities by turning to
Rawls’s method for constructing a realistic utopia—amethod
that relies on Rawls’s conception of the audience that ideal
theory is meant to reconcile.
RAWLS ON THE CONSTRUCTION
OF A REALISTIC UTOPIA
To perform the work of reconciliation, a realistic utopia must
offer a vision that is distant enough from our unjust present
that it can plausibly be called ideal while also appearing
sufﬁciently familiar that we can recognize it as connected to
the world we inhabit. What would be a principled method for
constructing a realistic utopia to perform this task? Rawls
explicitly draws his method from what he identiﬁes as the
Rousseauvian strain in Kant, speciﬁcally from his interpre-
tation of Rousseau’s famous dictum that political philosophy
should take “men as they are and laws as they might be”
(2001b, 7 and 13). Following this slogan, Rawls rejects the
idea that the indifference to suffering that made the Holo-
caust possible should lead us to believe that people are nat-
urally evil or “incurably cynical and self-centered” (2001b,
127). Instead, Rawls gives an account of human nature as
fundamentally reasonable—that is, capable of being moti-
vated by moral reasons. In the Discourse on Inequality, Rous-
seau defended his view of human nature through a kind
of imaginary natural history and introduced the methodology
of this argument by writing, “Let us therefore begin by setting
aside all the facts, for they do not affect the question” (1997,
132). It is not obvious that Rawls can do the same. Rousseau
and Kant shared a belief in the possibility of theodicy that
is unavailable to Rawls and unpersuasive for addressing a
democratic public with a diversity of beliefs about religion
and nature. Within the world, there is plenty of evidence that
people act very badly indeed, so what licenses Rawls to as-
sume that they will act justly in other circumstances?
Here, Rawls adopts Kant’s strategy of making a practically
necessary presupposition—now given a political twist and
refracted through an injunction that the Holocaust must not06/14/17 13:10ational
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“We must not allow these great evils of the past and present
to undermine our hope for the future of our society as be-
longing to a Society of liberal and decent Peoples around the
world. Otherwise, the wrongful, evil, and demonic conduct
of others destroys us too and seals their victory” (2001b, 22).
That is, Rawls justiﬁes his belief in the human capacity to
be reasonable by highlighting the practical importance of
adopting this viewpoint. The failure to adopt an appropriate
viewpoint on human action could mean resignation and
despair for the individual, but Rawls’s worry is ultimately
more political than existential; Rawls refers to “our hope”
because he identiﬁes the most important audience for rec-
onciliation as the public. In particular, Rawls argues that the
failure to believe that people naturally respond to moral
reasons contributes to bringing about the cynicism and self-
centeredness it already proclaims as fact. Rawls asserts that
the amorality of an unreconciled public can turn a cooper-
ative, democratic society into an unstable power struggle—a
situation he repeatedly identiﬁes with the Weimar Republic
that preceded Hitler’s regime (Rawls 2007, 8–9; see also
Rawls 1996, lix–lx). Such dramatic political stakes are not
mere hyperbole, but methodologically essential if the pre-
sumption of human reasonableness is to be justiﬁed by ap-
peal to practical necessity. Rawls makes this relation clear
when he writes: “Our hope for the future of our society rests
on the belief that the social world allows a reasonably just
constitutional democracy existing as a member of a rea-
sonably just Society of Peoples” (2001a, 11). Without be-
lieving in the realism of such a utopia, our hopes have no
ground and the future simply will not look worth pursuing—
and so not only must political philosophy provide a realistic
utopia to prevent that, it may invoke these practical effects
as a justiﬁcation for belief in utopian possibility.
The need to address this justiﬁcation for reconciliation
to the public shapes both the self-understanding of the po-
litical philosopher and the content of the realistic utopias she
conceives. Rawls writes, “What is the audience of political
philosophy? . . . Surely, in a democracy the answer to this
question is: all citizens generally” (2007, 1). This audience
must be addressed in a particular way; Rawls argues that the
practice of political philosophy should be democratic in the
further sense that “writers in political philosophy have no
more authority than any other citizen, and should claim no
more” (2007, 2). An account of reconciliation for democratic
publics should in principle be acceptable to all; identifying
an account of reconciliation with a partisan claim would be
especially problematic, as it could serve to discredit realistic
utopianism for partisans of other positions and reinforce
cynicism. Moreover, because they are not authorities, po-151247.proof.3d 6 Achorn Internlitical theorists cannot appeal to superior expertise in their
argument and ought to rely on claims that are already broadly
accepted by a democratic public. In this fashion, the urgent
practical task of reconciling a democratic public should guide
a theorist in deciding what material from the existing world
to use when constructing a realistic utopia that properly ful-
ﬁlls its practical aim.
This justiﬁcation for Rawls’s view of men as they are thus
shapes his understanding of laws as they might be. Which
facts about our unjust world can help us to see what insti-
tutions people would have in a more just one? How can we
know what human conduct we need to accommodate in our
realistic utopias and what can be dismissed as merely the
product of our own benighted institutions? These are difﬁ-
cult questions, but the need to ensure the public’s acceptance
of the answers puts pressure on Rawls to risk as little un-
certainty as possible in constructing his realistic utopia.
Consider Rawls’s ideal picture of international politics inThe
Law of Peoples. Rawls writes: “The speciﬁc conditions of our
world at any time—the status quo—do not determine the
ideal conception of the Society of Peoples” (2001b, 89–90;
emphasis added), but it is a curious and much-remarked-
upon feature of this realistic utopia that it closely resembles
prevailing understandings of the world, including a World
Trade Organization, a World Bank, and a United Nations
(2001b, 42–43; see also Buchanan 2000). This should seem
less curious in light of the methodology described above. No
one can doubt the “realism” of institutions that already exist.
Rawls means for a utopia that is an idealized version of
our world to seem acceptable and achievable to the public,
but its very familiarity raises a question: If people in the fu-
ture who share our nature act reasonably within institutions
not unlike ours, why do we not already live in that world?
For Rawls, it is not human nature, but the contingent ﬂaws
of existing political and social institutions that explain our
failure to have realized our ideals. He writes: “The social sys-
tem shapes the wants and aspirations that its citizens come
to have. It determines in part the sort of persons they want
to be as well as the sort of persons they are. Thus an economic
system is not only an institutional device for satisfying ex-
isting wants and needs but a way of creating and fashioning
wants in the future” (1999b, 229). Rawls means for this to
support his claim that a just society will be stable, but its
implications for own nonideal society are also important. An
unjust social system profoundly shapes the character of the
people who grow up under it and can explain their failure to
respond reasonably. The existence of unjust institutions does
not justify unreasonable or self-centered behavior, of course,
but simply explains it, resolving the apparent contradiction
between Rawls’s presumption of our reasonable nature and06/14/17 13:10ational
7. Rawls himself modeled this distance in his own life. Freeman re-
ports (2007, 5): “He regularly declined requests for interviews, and chose
not to take an active role in public life. He conscientiously avoided ce-
lebrity status. Rawls believed that philosophers are normally misunder-
stood when they address the public, and that though philosophy has a
major inﬂuence on political life, its inﬂuence is indirect, taking many years
before it becomes a part of a community’s moral consciousness.” There
are two notable exceptions to this avoidance. The ﬁrst was his opposition
to the war in Vietnam and his support for an effort to have the Harvard
faculty endorse a reform of the military draft that would have made se-
lection entirely by lot (see Pogge 2007, 19–22). The second came after his
1995 stroke, when he signed an amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court
in favor of the right to die, published as Dworkin et al. (1997).
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onciliation so important in the ﬁrst place.
However, this resolution points to a deep problem in
Rawls’s account. Rawls argued that a realistic utopia could
be connected to the present and consequently meaningful
for us in two ways: through the deep tendencies of the social
world and through extending what are ordinarily thought
to be the limits of practicable political possibility. Rawls
seems to assume that these amount to the same thing, be-
cause of humanity’s capacity to be moved by moral reasons.
But Rawls’s explanation of why we have failed to realize our
ideals points to how these two can come apart when existing
institutions are unjust, since those institutions shape the char-
acter and thereby the ordinary thoughts of those who grow
up under them. Is a vision that extends the ordinary thoughts
of an audience habituated to injustice likely to be wholly
utopian? Or will it be so marked by injustice that calling it
utopian inadvertently serves ideological ends?
LEARNING “THE LESSON OF THE HOLOCAUST”?
In seeking an ideal theory that can reconcile a democratic
public divided by injustice, Rawls faces a dilemma. Rawls
knows that our own society is riven by political disputes
about the basis of public justiﬁcation. He writes: “Our so-
ciety is not well-ordered: the public conception of justice
and its understanding of freedom and equality are in dispute.
Therefore, for us—you and me—a basis of public justiﬁcation
is still to be achieved” (1999a, 355). Yet Rawls nevertheless
addresses the audience for reconciliation as if it already lives in
a realistic utopia, offering a view that purports to draw from a
shared justiﬁcatory basis when it instead relies on premises
that are deeply disputed within actual politics. By treating
certain contentious claims as outside politics, such attempts
at reconciliation may needlessly enshrine certain facts about
the status quo as ideal when they are not. Rawls is aware of
this danger. In a footnote, he notes: “The idea of political phi-
losophy as reconciliation must be invoked with care. For po-
litical philosophy is always in danger of being used corruptly
as a defense of an unjust and unworthy status quo, and thus
of being ideological in Marx’s sense. From time to time we
must ask whether justice as fairness, or any other view, is ideo-
logical in this way; and if not, why not?” (Rawls 2001a, 4, n4;
see also Rawls 1999a, 326, n4, and 2007, 10, 359–62). Recon-
ciliation seeks to make us feel at the home in the world and
thereby risks encouraging complacency; there is thus a stand-
ing danger that it may be used to defend a status quo that is
not actually just. In this section, I will argue that Rawls’s at-
tempt to address a divided audience as though it were already
well ordered leads him into precisely the trap that he sought
to avoid.151247.proof.3d 7 Achorn InternSo why does Rawls address the public in this fashion?
Recall that Rawls’s worry is that actual democratic politics
can devolve into a tenuous and ultimately unstable balance
of power between cynical competing interest groups unless
individuals come to politics already reconciled, which pre-
pares them to see others as reasonable and to give due con-
sideration to their interests. Consequently, despite asserting
that political theorists should be understood as citizens in a
democracy like any others, Rawls also asserts that theory is a
practice that happens outside politics, not within it. He states
plainly: “Our answer to the question of whether a reasonably
just Society of Peoples is possible affects our attitudes toward
the world as a whole. Our answer affects us before we come to
actual politics, and limits or inspires how we take part in it”
(Rawls 2001b, 128, emphasis added; see also Rawls 2007, 7).
There is a perfectly common sense element to this separa-
tion of theory and “actual politics”; to put theory at the
heart of political life would be misguided aggrandizement.7
But the combination of Rawls’s aspiration to provide an
account that all can accept along with the necessity of recon-
ciling them before they engage in politics leads to a stronger
claim: what I will call the “priority thesis” that ideal theory
can and should promote reconciliation by relying only on ex-
periences, facts, and arguments that are themselves outside
politics—or at least are not being actively contested within
actual politics. To Rawls, looking for the resources to en-
vision a realistic utopia within the experience of conten-
tious democratic politics is a terrible risk, since to enter
politics unreconciled could propagate cynicism and distrust
with disastrous consequences. However, refusing this risk
means he must construct a realistic utopia using claims that
are already acceptable to a public shaped by existing unjust
institutions. By setting the stakes of reconciliation so high
in order to justify his presupposition of human reasonable-
ness on the grounds of practical necessity, Rawls has boxed
himself in. As a result, Rawls tries to guarantee reconcilia-
tion by having theorists address their audience employing
only claims that partisans of all stripes accept, despite the06/14/17 13:10ational
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context.
If taken seriously as a methodological guideline, this pri-
ority thesis undermines the democratic credentials of Rawls’s
view in three ways: ﬁrst, his view implicitly discourages the-
orists from acknowledging their own fallibility and reﬂecting
on how they are inﬂuenced by the politics of an unjust society;
second, the priority thesis limits the potential means for po-
litical theorists to address an audience, rendering it unneces-
sarily exclusive; third, his realistic utopia relies on contentious
partisan claims while purporting to stand outside such dis-
putes. These features all derive from the perceived need to
respond to an unjust world while bracketing the disagreement
that accompanies a disordered society. Taken together, they
have the ideological effect of directing ideal theory away from
confronting the scope and persistence of injustice’s effects. In
short, Rawls is right to conceive of the audience for political
theory as a democratic public, but he is wrong in his assump-
tions about the way to address that public in its current state.
First, suggesting that theorists can work outside of politics
stands in tension with his own account of the pervasive in-
ﬂuence of institutions and the inevitable effects when those
institutions are unjust. Consider how individuals are likely to
be inﬂuenced by the context of unjustiﬁable racial and eco-
nomic inequality, for example, as the recipients of unde-
served beneﬁts understandably struggle to rationalize their
holdings (Mills 2015). Contestation is pervasive under such
conditions, extending to judgments, doctrines, and factual
matters, and there is no reason to think that professional
intellectuals are immune from this. However, since Rawls
seeks for ideal theory to guarantee reconciliation, acknowl-
edging the provisional and fallible nature of the theorist’s
realistic utopia risks introducing a dangerous uncertainty,
and so the theorist’s own location within politics must be
downplayed.
Second, the priority thesis leads to a needlessly narrow
picture of how philosophers can address others. Seeking
venues for deliberation that stand outside actual politics,
Rawls suggests that other citizens could come across ideas
from theorists in “editorials and discussions debating these
ideas in newspapers and in journals of opinion” (Rawls 2007,
6). However, the contemporary media is itself hardly neutral
or nonpartisan; the inﬂuence of party politics and the proﬁt
motive on the structure of communications is clear. Given the
evident unreliability of informing the public through such
methods, Rawls often ends up settling for the much more
limited and elite audience that political theory typically ad-
dresses, particularly the judiciary. For example, he singles
out “liberal writers in philosophy [inﬂuencing] the judges on
a Supreme Court in a constitutional regime like ours” (Rawls151247.proof.3d 8 Achorn Intern2007, 4) as one of the most powerful way for theorists to
engage in politics. Such communication among elites may
be effective, but addressing political theory exclusively to such
a limited audience undermines his own more democratic
aims.
The third major problem concerns the content of a re-
alistic utopia constructed with the aim of reconciling a di-
vided public. Consider again the strikingly familiar view
of international politics Rawls describes as realistically uto-
pian. In defending limits on the amount of global redistri-
bution of wealth required in ideal theory, Rawls crucially
relies on the disputed economic claim that “the political
culture of a burdened society is all-important” for its de-
velopment (2001b, 108); in other words, rich countries are
not necessarily obliged to share their wealthwith poor countries,
since it is the culture of poor countries that is responsible
for their poverty. Elsewhere he rather startlingly describes
an Islamic people in his realistic utopia as resembling the
state Hegel outlines in The Philosophy of Right and, in de-
fending this suggestion from the charge of “baseless uto-
pianism,” he notes that an ideal theory must consider that
“most Muslim rulers . . . [have] sought empire and territory”
(2001b, 75–78). These claims about economic development
and Islamic leadership are about the institutions of our
world, and they are obviously contentious; candidates for
ofﬁce today debate precisely these questions about the efﬁ-
cacy of foreign aid and the character of Muslim societies,
for example. My point is not to take sides in these particular
debates, but simply to point out that there are sides. Despite
his aspiration, the facts on which Rawls relies in construct-
ing and defending his realistic utopia are subject to dispute
within actual politics rather than belonging to a set of shared
premises that precede politics or that can be vindicated by
shared justiﬁcatory standards.
Rawls’s account faces these problems because, in response
to features of our world that cause despair, it seeks to culti-
vate hopeful attitudes without acknowledging the persis-
tence of the unjust structures that cause despair and op-
pression; the result is an attitude ill ﬁtted to its full social
context. A contrast with Hegelian reconciliation makes this
clear. For Hegel, objective institutional arrangements were
primary; to be subjectively reconciled without the right kind
of actual social world was impossible or, as Marxists would
later add, to be the victim of false consciousness. By contrast,
Rawls’s conception gives priority to achieving the subjective
attitude of reconciliation as a precondition to the achieve-
ment of just institutions, since we must be reconciled in
order to engage in effective political action. This difference
is highlighted by what Rawls takes to be the most likely
permanent threat to reconciliation. While Hegel acknowl-06/14/17 13:10ational
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tive alienation even in an otherwise reconciled world, Rawls
sees fundamentalism as the most important form of alien-
ation in an otherwise reconciled world—an attitudinal re-
jection of reasonability that he understands to be purely
subjective and without any material or institutional basis.8
In seeking to protect hope, Rawls reiﬁes attitudes to
politics so that they cease to be appropriately responsive
to their circumstances. Rawls’s conception of reconciliation
sprang from a deep experience of the singularity of the Ho-
locaust and a proclamation that theodicy must be rejected
because it is “hideous and evil” to try to bend atrocity into
reason. When Rawls writes, “Some seem to think that this
idea [of a realistic utopia] is a fantasy, particularly after
Auschwitz” (2001b, 19), one cannot help but suspect that the
Rawls who was 78 when The Law of Peoples was published
was thinking of the 24-year-old Rawls who lost his faith. But
while Auschwitz shook Rawls’s faith in God, it apparently
cemented his consequent belief in human goodness, as he
writes: “The fact of the Holocaust and our now knowing
that human society admits this demonic possibility, however,
should not affect our hopes as expressed by the idea of a re-
alistic utopia and Kant’s foedus paciﬁcum. Dreadful evils have
long persisted” (2001b, 21). Rawls’s practically necessary faith
in human reasonability means that the Holocaust cannot
tell us anything consequential about what attitudes to take
up to humanity or human possibility; it can only tell us
about our institutions. Thus, Rawls, who found efforts to
rationalize and explain the Holocaust to be despicable, also
asserts that “The lesson of the Holocaust is, rather, that a
charismatic leader of a powerful totalitarian and militaristic
state can, with incessant and rabid propaganda, incite a
sufﬁcient number of the population to carry out even enor-
mously and hideously evil plans. The Holocaust might have
happened anywhere such a state came to be” (2001a, 100).
Rawls’s claim is surely true, as far as it goes, but when it comes
to taking the full measure of what the Holocaust can teach us,
it is too limited. In the shift from theodicy to sociology,
Rawls seems to have lost sight of the depth of the problem
that he is addressing.
ADORNO ON RECONCILIATION, COLDNESS,
AND SUFFERING
Let us return to the nature of that problem to consider an-
other way of responding. Like Rawls, Adorno regarded the
Holocaust as threatening to the meaningfulness of political8. For Hegel on poverty, see Hegel (1991, 265–67); for Rawls on fun-
damentalism, see Rawls (2001b, 126–27).
151247.proof.3d 9 Achorn Internaction and responded by appropriating the concept of rec-
onciliation fromKant andHegel to ﬁnd sources of hope in its
aftermath. However, where Rawls seeks to guarantee that
despair at the Holocaust can be overcome in the name of
preventing further barbarity, Adorno believes that a sounder
method for employing reconciliation against barbarity can
come from attending to our own implication in on-going
suffering. In Rawls’s methodology, the aim of ideal theory
is palliative, but where Rawls soothes, Adorno aggravates.
He reminds us that, in an unjust world, while it is practically
necessary to feel somewhat at home, this should not direct
our attention away from the unnecessary suffering that
surrounds us. This suffering can force us to acknowledge
our relation to existing injustice and the failure to make the
world a home for all. But Adorno argues that this acknowl-
edgement can itself help to fuel our hopes, revealing images
of utopia even amid catastrophe.
Adorno’s biographical and philosophical engagement
with the Holocaust is better known than Rawls’s. The son
of a Jewish father who converted to Protestantism, Adorno
ﬂed Germany in 1934 and eventually moved to the United
States in 1938 before returning to what was then West
Germany in 1949. Unsurprisingly, the experience of exile
from fascism marked Adorno deeply, and some of his best-
known writing concerns the challenge of living after such
catastrophe, from war-time works like Dialectic of Enlight-
enment and Minima Moralia to his later magnum opus
Negative Dialectics, written when he was a prominent public
intellectual seeking to prevent the return of fascism in a
country whose transition to democracy was, he believed, in-
complete at best (Müller-Doohm 2005, 325–48). Like Rawls,
Adorno rejects an entirely Hegelian reconciliation that reveals
a world that is already rational, arguing that “the smallest trace
of senseless suffering in the empirical world belies all the
identitarian philosophy that would talk us out of that suffer-
ing” (1973, 203). For Adorno, the persistence of suffering
is itself irrational, clear evidence that Hegel was wrong to
suggest that the world had an underlying order that could
make sense from both subjective and objective points of view.
Instead, the Holocaust shows catastrophic suffering to be one
of the deﬁning characteristics of our time. The belief that
complete reconciliation is now possible not only disrespects
those who died and those who continue to suffer but also
helps to perpetuate suffering by directing us away from at-
tending to it. Adorno argues: “He who registers the death-
camps as a technical mishap in civilization’s triumphal pro-
cession, the martyrdom of the Jews as world-historically
irrelevant, not only falls short of the dialectical vision but re-
verses the meaning of his own politics: to hold ultimate
calamity in check” (Adorno 1978, 234). Adorno thus shares06/14/17 13:10ational
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with preventing society from returning to barbarity, but he
offers a different account of how thinking can do so.
Rawls proposes addressing an audience of democratic
agents as though they are presently capable of universal
agreement about matters central to reconciliation and, in
doing so, places the theorist outside politics and brackets
how existing unjust institutions shape the public. Adorno
insists on the particularity of the theorist and places her
ﬁrmly within political life, in part by attending to how her
own life is marked by unjust institutions. Adorno thereby
illustrates how political theory can help its audience endure
injustice in a way that incorporates what Rawls leaves out.
Adorno sketches this possibility when he asks: “Whether
after Auschwitz you can go on living—especially whether
one who escaped by accident, one who by rights should
have been killed, may go on living. His mere survival calls
for the coldness, the basic principle of bourgeois subjectiv-
ity, without which there could have been no Auschwitz;
this is the drastic guilt of him who was spared” (1973, 362–
63). Living after the Holocaust requires that one inure
oneself to atrocity just in order to go on, yet it is this very
indifference to the suffering of others that made Auschwitz
possible in the ﬁrst place. Such coldness continues to facil-
itate injustice. In 1968, Adorno wrote: “In the security of
America . . . it would be difﬁcult to believe that Vietnam is
robbing anyone of sleep. . . . Whoever imagines that as a
product of this society he is free of the bourgeois coldness
harbors illusions about himself as much as about the world;
without such coldness one could not live” (Adorno 2005,
274). Adorno frames the dilemma of reconciliation in an
unjust world by asking, how can we be reconciled to a world
of suffering when it seems that such reconciliation would
be complicit with injustice?
To answer this question, we need to understand why
Adorno believes the mere act of survival can make us guilty.
One key is the claim that we collectively have the capacity to
relieve much existing suffering and oppression. He writes:
“Thanks to the present state of the technical forces of pro-
duction no one on the planet need suffer deprivation any-
more. Whether there will be further want and oppression—
which are the same thing—will be decided solely by the
avoidance of catastrophe through the rational establishment
of the whole society as humanity” (2005, 144). Consider
that the world’s richest 92 people have as much wealth as
the poorest 3.5 billion, making it easy to imagine that a
feasible amount of redistribution could end global poverty
(Hardoon 2015). Yet I cannot change these circumstances
single-handedly, and cooperative group efforts to do so seem
uncertain at best and may even appear futile. In the mean-151247.proof.3d 10 Achorn Interntime, to be at home in a world where suffering could be re-
lieved but is instead tolerated or even intensiﬁed would be a
false reconciliation, since it requires overlooking how the
features of the world that ensure one’s comfort also make it
inhospitable to others. Despite this, we must ﬁnd some way
to live, even though to do so means accepting some ac-
commodation with existing unjust institutions and inuring
ourselves to on-going horror simply in order to take care of
ourselves.
Where Rawls’s account of utopian thinking directs us
away from thinking about contemporary injustice lest it
provoke cynicism about human nature, Adorno actually
directs us to attend to the experience of distorting ourselves
to live amid catastrophe. We can certainly hope that people
are capable of acting reasonably, but doing so should not be
premised on suppressing our cynical coldness entirely, since
that is impossible to do in good faith while injustice and
suffering persist.
Instead, though indifference is necessary if we wish to live
our own lives, we should take responsibility for making
ourselves cold and see this as a possible source of hope. That
is a surprising suggestion since the labor of producing our
indifference seems more like a source of despair, a sign that
the world is so broken that we all must become similarly self-
interested in order to survive. Through the work of making
ourselves cold, we are indeed “turning into something that
makes us shudder,” but Adorno says that the experience of
coming to terms with this is “what compels us to philoso-
phize” (1973, 364). Adorno argues that philosophy can serve
as an expression of our discomfort with living in a world
where our own survival depends on insulating ourselves
from it. If it is honest, thinking that is rooted in this dis-
comfort and seeks to envision a world without it must also
acknowledge and take responsibility for one’s own contri-
bution to producing one’s indifference. While pervasive
coldness makes us similar, thinking about the possibility of
reconciliation can thus individuate us when it compels us to
take responsibility; I am the one who made myself cold in
order to go on. Adorno’s wager is that taking responsibility,
even for such a damaging act, exhibits a form of freedom and
individuality that is compelled and constrained by existing
injustice, but which can also facilitate imagining a world of
fuller freedom and individuality for all. Identifying this ac-
tion as mine makes me guilty of a kind of complicity, but it
also provides a trace of the freedom that would come when
injustice has ended and complicity is no longer necessary.
For Adorno, when philosophy serves the very practical
purpose of expressing disquiet with what an unjust world
requires of its inhabitants, it thus also serves as a source of
hope for reconciliation—a way out of the “catastrophic vi-06/14/17 13:10ational
9. Adorno engages in a rare bit of understatement when he writes of
this condescending proposal: “I am not ignoring the fact that such people
would make themselves liked only with great difﬁculty” (2005, 196–97).
For a defense of Adorno on popular education, see Mariotti (2014).
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in changing the world” but in which the very institutions that
must be changed have damaged us so much that we seem
incapable of being the agents of that change (2006, 76).
Adorno consequently placed such a great emphasis on pop-
ular education after the Holocaust that biographers describe
him as “a ubiquitous presence in the media” in the 1950s
and 1960s (Müller-Doohm 2005, 374). Convinced that peo-
ple could develop their individuality by understanding the
sources of their own coldness, Adorno suggested that his
audience could taste freedom and ﬁnd joy in “the power of
the mind to retain its self-control in the face of the sorrow”
caused by injustice (2006, 137). Thus, the spread of critical
thinking could give hope for further social transformation
and underwrite Adorno’s belief that “Freedom can be achieved
in reality. And in contrast to the entire dialectical tradition
of Hegel and Marx, I would almost go so far as to say that
actually this has always been possible, that it has been pos-
sible at every moment” (2006, 181). In order to realize that
utopian possibility, though, we ﬁrst need to realize our guilt;
then, Adorno argues, “Given the way the world is organized,
even the simplest demand for integrity and decency must
necessarily lead almost everyone to protest” (2006, 167).
Suggesting that we can draw an image of freedom from
our own discomfort with injustice gives Adorno’s account
of reconciliation a more inward and self-reﬂective character
than Rawls’s. This helps it avoid the latter’s methodological
need to construct a utopia from the beliefs of a public ha-
bituated by injustice, but it also generates its own problems.
For example, it famously never led Adorno himself to public
protest, which suggests that his account of reconciliation
may not readily facilitate political action. Indeed, Adorno
himself became the target of protests after he asked the
police to remove students who were brieﬂy occupying the
ofﬁces of the Institute for Social Research in January 1969
(Müller-Doohm 2005, 464–65). Adorno’s relationship to
political action is thus ambivalent, as suggested by how he
can only “almost go so far as to say” that freedom is possible.
On the one hand, he praised the student activists for having
“interrupted the smooth transition to the totally adminis-
tered world” by, among other measures, opposing the emer-
gency laws supported by the Grand Coalition of major Ger-
man parties (Adorno and Marcuse 1999, 136); on the other
hand, he found even signing petitions objectionable, “be-
cause in their inevitable desire to have a political impact,
they always contain an element of untruth or presuppose a
knowledge of speciﬁc circumstances” (Müller-Doohm 2005,
414). This ambivalence has many sources, but for my pur-
poses, the most important is the way that Adorno’s theory
of reconciliation lacks any grounds for ﬁnding sources of151247.proof.3d 11 Achorn Internhope in other people or our relationship to them. In par-
ticular, Adorno’s account of suffering and self-imposed in-
difference provides no tools for imagining equal cooperative
relations. Instead, it lends itself to an inegalitarian concep-
tion of the audience for reconciliation as suffering victims
addressed by guilty theorists. This is doubly anti-democratic:
on the one hand, it implies a philosophizing elite that does
not experience oppression directly, though their indifference
facilitates it in others; on the other hand, it also implicitly
removes the agency of others by presenting them primarily as
suffering victims. Adorno even goes so far as to say that be-
cause he sees the executioners of Auschwitz “under the spell
of unfreedom,” he thus “conceives of them as victims and not
just as murderers” (2006, 203). But seeing others as either
victims of, or complicit with, oppression (or both) does not
facilitate treating them as equal partners in political action.
One can see this at work in Adorno’s practical suggestions
for popular education, like his proposal for “mobile educa-
tion groups” that would travel from cities to promote the
“debarbarization” of the countryside (2005, 196–97).9 The pre-
sumption that urban educators have nothing to learn about
suffering and utopia from rural residents is symptomatic
of the danger with this conception of reconciliation’s au-
dience. Like Rawls’s, Adorno’s effort to offer sources of
hopes for a future of justice and freedom falls short. Nev-
ertheless, as I discuss in the next section, Adorno’s account
offers important lessons for developing a more democratic
mode of addressing political theory to a public suffering
injustice—one that can better avoid the ideological trap
Rawls fell into.
THINKING UTOPIA MORE DEMOCRATICALLY
Rawls’s aspiration to guarantee that reconciliation occurs
before political engagement undermines the democratic na-
ture of his view by obscuring the effects of existing injustice
on the theorist herself and on the democratic public, which
was addressed as though it was already well ordered. Adorno’s
account argues that we can ﬁnd hope in taking responsi-
bility for our damaging accommodations to such injustice,
but it has difﬁculty moving from this individualizing mo-
ment to collective action—despite insisting on the possi-
bility and desirability of this passage. What is needed is a
theory that avoids these traps by conceiving of both a dem-
ocratic audience for reconciliation and a democratic mode06/14/17 13:10ational
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tures of such a fully democratic theory of reconciliation amid
injustice: ﬁrst, acknowledgement of the inevitability of dis-
agreement; second, acceptance that philosophy is itself a
political practice that may fail; third, seeing our relations with
others as sources of hope, which in turn requires ensuring
that our utopias include them. Such democratic reconcilia-
tion is necessarily plural and provisional; while our sources
of hope can differ, we should all be prepared to revise our
utopias when we ﬁnd that they preserve the causes of others’
suffering.
First, theorists who seek to reconcile democratic publics
need not avoid disagreement, even on fundamental matters.
In this chastened form, utopian thinking is not offered as a
guaranteed solution to despair, and, since it no longer needs
to ensure success for all, it can drop Rawls’s requirement
that it employ only facts beyond dispute in favor of ac-
knowledging that some of its premises are provisional, non-
ideal, or disputed within actual politics. This does not mean
that utopian thinking should become self-consciously sec-
tarian or renounce its ambitions to address a public. Rawls
rightly observes that, when political theory serves a demo-
cratic purpose by identifying reasons to believe in the pos-
sibility of achieving justice, its character should be shaped
by the audience it addresses. However, because he fails to
account for the disordered nature of a public structured by
injustice, Rawls offers an overly narrow view of what kinds
of address are democratically appropriate today. For exam-
ple, in the context of a market economy characterized by
distributive injustice, it can be effective to speak from one’s
own perspective without trying to tailor one’s presentation
to what one imagines would comfort an audience. Reﬂect-
ing on the success of books like Dialectic of Enlightenment,
Adorno wrote that his works “were written without prac-
tical intentions and nonetheless exercised some practical
inﬂuence. That inﬂuence came from the fact that in a world
where even thoughts have become commodities and pro-
voke sales resistance, no one could suppose when reading
these volumes that he was being sold or talked into some-
thing” (2005, 277; “sales resistance” is originally in English).
Given a social world in which texts circulate as commodities
and news is transmitted for proﬁt, Adorno attributes the en-
during appeal of his thought to a lack of apparent intention
to be practically effective. Of course, such an approach has
its own costs; just as Rawls’s view risked charges of being
ideological by envisioning utopias that resembled the pres-
ent too closely, theorizing that makes no concessions to the
public risks charges of navel-gazing and undemocratic in-
accessibility. Because we do not live in a well-ordered society
in which there is general endorsement of shared standards151247.proof.3d 12 Achorn Internof public justiﬁcation, any utopian conception must be of-
fered to the public with the hope that it may inspire hope.
But there is no guarantee that it will be received that way;
in that sense, it is a political action like any other, a risk.
Rawls assumes that we will not take such a risk without
some reason to believe that things could turn out all right
and consequently believes that presupposing human rea-
sonableness is practically necessary. However, one can share
Rawls’s worry about the potential meaninglessness of re-
sisting injustice without believing that it must be assuaged
before political action begins. Instead, members of a demo-
cratic public can recognize that political action is always on-
going and they are already taking a risk by living in society.
Our position is not that of a person on a diving board who
needs encouragement in order to take the plunge; we are
more like a group on a life raft that needs a reason to believe
dry land can be reached if most of the people on the raft can
ﬁgure out how to row in the same direction. In this spirit,
Adorno reminds us that “in the ﬁnal analysis thinking is
itself a form of behavior” (2001, 4), shaped by its environ-
ment like other behavior; as a consequence, he suggests, “We
need to hold fast to moral norms, to self-criticism, to the
question of right and wrong, and at the same time to a sense
of the fallibility of the authority that has the conﬁdence to
undertake such self-criticism” (Adorno 2001, 169).
This enables a more democratic form of address than
attempting to guarantee reconciliation; political theorizing
that acknowledges its own fallibility can make it easier for
the theorist to address her audience as equals. On this view,
since reasons for hope need not be provided before politics
begins, their effectiveness can be enhanced rather than un-
dermined by acknowledging that we are all in the same boat,
as it were, and that our theorization of reconciliation may
be affected by the unjust institutions we live in.
Finally, a more democratic view of reconciliation would
ﬁnd hope for a just world in our relations with others.
Adorno’s viewmakes theory into a practice, but at the cost of
making all other practice seem impossible because of how it
orients his audience to regard others as suffering victims to
be pitied. Not only does this attitude imply a hierarchical
relation, but, as Adorno himself notes, such compassion
“tacitly maintains and gives its sanction to the negative
condition of powerlessness in which the object of our pity
ﬁnds himself” (Adorno 2001, 173). The focus on suffering
thus depoliticizes and naturalizes unjust relations that ought
to be contested and shown to be contingent. By contrast,
Rawls’s account asserts the political equality of theorist and
audience, but it sees this relation expressed by an impossible
agreement among them; disagreement about ideals becomes
evidence of the futility of politics. A better approach would06/14/17 13:10ational
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ity and as sources of hope for its fuller realization. By giving
us hope for achieving justice in the future, reconciliation is
meant to help us live together in an imperfect democratic
society, so we must be especially alert when we are told that
the utopia that comforts us also preserves within it features
that would make that society inhospitable to others. For ex-
ample, in discussing the list of contingencies that his prin-
ciples of justice correct for, Rawls says that race and gender
are not included because “we are mainly concerned with
ideal theory” (2001a, 65). This suggests that ideal theory is
not informed by race and gender, but only by their absence
and purported irrelevance. But Rawls’s assurance here is con-
testable; many ﬁnd sources of hope and even images of utopia
in the solidarities formed around these identities. Even if
such solidarities are partly a product of existing inequality
and would be unnecessary in a fully just society, experiences
born of injustice can nevertheless inform our ideals, as Adorno
showed. Since people are differently situated with respect
to unjust institutions, it should not surprise us when others
propose sources of hope we were not otherwise able to per-
ceive. Indeed, we might ﬁnd hope for justice precisely in the
ability of others to show us forms of meaningful political
action we would otherwise overlook.
Rawls does not consistently exhibit this blindspot toward
the potential for political experiences to shape our utopias.
He argues that the religious wars in the wake of the Refor-
mation eventually led to a new way of living organized
around toleration. Rawls describes this as “the discovery of
a new social possibility” (2001a, 197), and he gives no reason
to think that further new possibilities could not be discov-
ered. I want to close by suggesting that Rawls’s failure to
treat the Holocaust as a new and terrible social possibility
hampers his effort to offer a persuasive practical defense of
political theory in its wake. His determination to guarantee
reconciliation before we enter politics leads him to claim
that, for practical purposes, we already know all we need to
know about human possibility. But to close ourselves off
from discovering new possibilities, good and bad, needlessly
curtails the potential for radical critique and blocks us from
confronting some urgent sources of despair. To be more
consistent and democratic defenders of political theory amid
injustice, we should embrace a conception of reconciliation
that acknowledges that our realistic utopias are not fully
ideal but rely upon the kind of nonideal and disputed un-
derstandings that are available to us within our existing,
unjust social world. Since we cannot guarantee getting it
right in advance, we should be ready to alter the utopias that
give us hope when others tell us that our ideals preserve the
causes of their suffering or exclude the sources of their joy.151247.proof.3d 13 Achorn InternACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author thanks Dana Howard, Charles Beitz, Derek Bow-
man, Julie Cooper, Stephen Macedo, Jan-Werner Müller, Jen-
nifer Pitts, Ethan Porter, and James Lindley Wilson, as well as
audiences at Georgetown University, University of Chicago,
York University, the American Political Science Association,
and the Western Political Science Association.
REFERENCES
Adorno, Theodor. 1973. Negative Dialectics. Translated by E. B. Ashton.
New York: Continuum.
Adorno, Theodor. 1978. Minima Moralia: Reﬂections from Damaged Life.
Translated by E. F. N. Jephcott. New York: Verso Books.
Adorno, Theodor. 2000. Introduction to Sociology. Edited by Cristoph
Gödde and translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Adorno, Theodor. 2001. Problems of Moral Philosophy. Edited by Thomas
Schröder and translated by Rodney Livingstone. Stanford, CA: Stan-
ford University Press.
Adorno, Theodor. 2005. Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords.
Translated by Henry W. Pickford. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Adorno, Theodor. 2006. History and Freedom: Lectures, 1964–1965. Edited
by Rolf Tiedemann and translated by Rodney Livingstone. Malden,
MA: Polity.
Adorno, Theodor, and Herbert Marcuse. 1999. “Correspondence on the
German Student Movement.” Translated by Esther Leslie. New Left
Review 233:123–316.
Brooks, Peter. 1992. Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Nar-
rative. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Buchanan, Allen. 2000. “Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished
Westphalian World.” Ethics 110 (4): 697–721.
Cohen, Gerald Allan. 2008. Rescuing Justice and Equality. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Cohen, Joshua. 2009. “Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus.” In Joshua
Cohen, Philosophy, Politics, Democracy: Selected Essays. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 38–60.
Dworkin, Ronald, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, T.M. Scanlon,
and Judith Jarvis Thomson. 1997. “Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers’
Brief.” New York Review of Books 44 (5): 41–47.
Flikschuh, Katrin. 2000. Kant and Modern Political Philosophy. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Freeman, Samuel. 2007. Rawls. New York: Routledge.
Geuss, Raymond. 2005. Outside Ethics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Goldman, Loren. 2012. “In Defense of Blinders: On Kant, Political Hope
and the Need for Practical Belief ” Political Theory 40 (4): 497–523.
Gregory, Eric. 2007. “Before the Original Position: The Neo-orthodox
Theology of the Young John Rawls.” Journal of Religious Ethics 35 (2):
179–206.
Hardimon, Michael. 1994. Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The Project of Rec-
onciliation. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hardoon, Deborah. 2015.Wealth: Having It All and Wanting More. Oxfam
Issue Brieﬁng. Oxford: Oxfam International.
Hegel, G. W. F. 1991. Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Edited by AllenW.
Wood and translated by H. B. Nisbet. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Kant, Immanuel. 1996. Practical Philosophy. Edited by Mary J. Gregor.
New York: Cambridge University Press.06/14/17 13:10ational
q7
q8
q9
000 / Practical Uses and Ideological Abuses of Political Theory as Reconciliation Benjamin L. McKeanKant, Immanuel. 1997.Kant: PoliticalWritings. 2nd ed. Edited byHans Reiss
and translated by H. B. Nisbet. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, Immanuel. 1998. Critique of Pure Reason. Edited and translated by Paul
Guyer and Allen W. Wood. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, Immanuel. 2005. Notes and Fragments. Edited by Paul Guyer and
translated by Curtis Bowman, Paul Guyer, and Frederick Rauscher.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mariotti, Shannon L. 2014. “Adorno on the Radio: Democratic Leadership
as Democratic Pedagogy.” Political Theory 42 (4): 415–42.
Mills, Charles W. 2015. “Global White Ignorance.” In Matthias Gross and
Linsey McGoey, eds., Routledge International Handbook of Ignorance
Studies. New York: Routledge, 217–27.
Müller-Doohm, Stefan. 2005. Adorno: A Biography. Translated by Rodney
Livingstone. Malden, MA: Polity.
Pogge, Thomas. 2007. John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice. Trans-
lated by Michelle Kosch. New York: Oxford University Press.
Rawls, John. 1996. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rawls, John. 1999a. “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” In Samuel
Freeman, ed., Collected Papers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 303–58.
Rawls, John. 1999b. A Theory of Justice. Revised ed. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.151247.proof.3d 14 Achorn InternRawls, John. 2000. Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy. Edited by
Barbara Herman. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, John. 2001a. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Edited by Erin
Kelly. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, John. 2001b. The Law of Peoples; with “The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, John. 2007. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy. Edited
by Samuel Freeman. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, John. 2009. A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith: with
“On My Religion”. Edited by Thomas Nagel. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. 1997. The Discourses and Other Early Political Writ-
ings. Edited and translated by Victor Gourevitch. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Sen, Amartya. 2009. The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Simmons, A. John. 2010. “Ideal and Nonideal Theory.” Philosophy and
Public Affairs 38 (1): 5–36.
Weithman, Paul. 2009. “John Rawls and the Task of Political Philosophy.”
Review of Politics 71 (1): 113–25.
Wiens, David. 2015. “Against Ideal Guidance.” Journal of Politics 77 (2):
433–46.06/14/17 13:10ational
